UNMAS in Somalia

2018 ANNUAL REPORT

EXPLOSIVE HAZARD ANALYSIS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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List of Acronyms

- AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
- AU - African Union
- BRA - Banadir Regional Administration
- CLO – Community Liaison Officer
- EDD - Explosive Detection Dog
- EOD - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- ERW - Explosive Remnants of War
- EU TM - European Union Training Mission
- FFE – Free From Explosive
- FGS – Federal Government of Somalia
- FMS – Federal Member State
- FOB – Forward Operating Base
- IED - Improvised Explosive Device
- ISMS - Information Support Management Section
- KAPB - Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour
- MEU - Mission Enabling Unit
- MIA - Mogadishu International Airport
- MSR - Main Supply Route
- MTT - Multi-Tasking Team
- SAA – Small Arms Ammunition
- SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapon
- SEMA - Somalia Explosive Management Authority
- SOW - Stand-Off Weapon
- SSF – Somali Security Forces
- TCC - Troop Contributing Countries
• ToT – Training of Trainer
• UN - United Nations
• UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service
• UNSC – United Nations Security Council
• UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
• UNSOM – United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
• UNSOS - United Nations Support Office in Somalia
• UPDF - Uganda People’s Defence Force
• UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
• VBIED - Vehicle-Borne IED
• WAM - Weapons and Ammunition Management
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1. Background

Somalia has been in a state of internal clan conflict and civil war since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Several attempts have been made by the international community to support Somalia’s efforts in re-establishing itself as a sovereign state including the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 1991, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in 1993, the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000, followed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. In 2006 during the TFG administration, the Islamic Courts Union, an Islamist militia group, captured Mogadishu after defeating clan warlords and assumed control of southern parts of the country and instituted Sharia Law. The ICU were however, soon driven out with the support of the AU peacekeepers and Ethiopian forces. After their defeat, the ICU splintered into smaller factions that resulted in the formation of a jihadist fundamentalist group called Al Shabaab rising to prominence. Since its establishment Al Shabaab militants have waged war against perceived ‘enemies of Islam’ and remain engaged in fighting against the Somali Government. Al Shabaab continues to be a potent threat to the security situation in Somalia.

As part of the official ‘Roadmap for the End of Transition’, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established in 2012, making it the first permanent central government in the country since the beginning of the civil war. In February 2017, Somali Members of Parliament (MPs) elected a new President, Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamed, through a political process supported by the UN.

In addition to the political turmoil, clan conflicts, and civil war, Somalia went through a severe humanitarian crisis in the form of drought and famine in 1992, then in 2011. In January 2007, the African Union (AU), through its Peace and Security Council, created the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and UN resolution UN/SC/RES/1863 established the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in 2009. UNSOA was later replaced by United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), following the adoption of UN Security Council resolution UN/SC/RES/2245 in November 2015. UNSOS works to provide support to AMISOM, UNSOM, and the elements of the Somali Security Forces (SSF) which conduct joint operations with AMISOM.

2. Introduction

UNMAS deployed to Somalia in 2008 to support Humanitarian Mine Action activities, evolving thereafter as a critical component of UNSOA. UNMAS provides logistical support to AMISOM through planning and mobility operations, advice, analysis, training, mentoring, specialized
equipment, Explosive Detection Dog\(^1\) (EDD) and clearance teams. Providing AMISOM with an explosive hazard mitigation capability enables AMISOM to remain mobile despite the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and to protect its personnel and assets. The annual report on Explosive Hazard Analysis presented by UNMAS in Somalia is a communication tool to:

- Outline the explosive threats faced in Somalia in 2018;
- Engage with all partners involved in mitigating explosive threats in Somalia;
- Present the explosive hazard threat, challenges, and mitigation measures taken in 2018 and what is planned in 2019 onwards.

Four explosive threats were examined in the preparation of this report, namely; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Mines / Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) / Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM); and Stand-Off Weapons (SOW). In the case of IEDs, Mines / ERW and SOW threats, each is examined for the reporting period and the mitigation activities are outlined along with the challenges faced, followed by an overview of the mitigation initiatives for the next reporting period.

3. **Explosive Hazard Threat Assessment and Responses**

3.1 **Improvised Explosive Device Threats**

![Graph showing IED incidents and casualties between 2016 and 2018](image)

*Fig 1: Improvised Explosive Device Incidents and Casualties between 2016 and 2018*

There has been a marked increase in IED incidents and IED casualties between 2016 and 2018 as shown in Figure 1 (above). There were 496 recorded IED incidents in 2018 compared to 296 in 2016

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\(^1\) Explosive Detection Dog - refers to a dog specifically trained to locate and correctly indicate, the presence of vaporized molecules of defined explosive substances.
During 2018 the majority of IEDs incidents took place on Main Supply Routes\(^2\) (MSRs). Lower Shabelle region was the most affected.

\(^2\) Main Supply Routes are routes designated within an area of operations upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military (AMISOM and SSF) operations.
Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions registered the highest number of IED incidents in the past three years while Middle Shabelle, Bakool and Gedo showed a reduction in the number of IED incidents between 2017 and 2018.

The increase in IED incidents in Hiran region, were primarily due to last year’s joint AMISOM/SSF operation to reopen the MSR from Beletweyne through Jalalaqsi, while the increase in incidents in the Bay region, shows an increased focus on the MSR from Baidoa to Mogadishu, presumably in light of the planned transition.

While AMISOM remained the primary target of IED attacks throughout 2018, overall, there was a reduction in the number of IED incidents targeting AMISOM as the year progressed. Conversely, there has been a steady increase in the number of IED incidents targeting the SSF (see Figure 4 below). There are two primary explanations for this; AMISOM became more capable of operating in an IED threat environment through training and equipment; and also that SSF have been exposed to more risk through increased operations in the second half of the year, without sufficient capacity to mitigate the threat of IEDs.
The nature of the threat has not changed in 2018 and AMISOM remains the main target in terms of incidents. Consequently, UNMAS’ support to AMISOM is to enhance confidence and competence of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to operate in countering the IED threat, through an efficient and coordinated IED threat mitigation support system. Throughout 2018, UNMAS enhanced AMISOM’s capacity and capabilities to minimize the risks from IED incidents through advice, mentoring, training and equipment supply in all the Sectors.

3.1.1 Activities

In addition to the existing operational capacity already present in the sectors, UNMAS provided mentoring teams with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or IED threat mitigation specialists, combat medic mentors and combat engineers. The mentoring teams provided training, technical advice and mentored AMISOM teams operating in the Forward Operating Bases.

UNMAS provided EDD teams and handlers, in support of AMISOM and AU police operations, including search activities in the vital installations like airports and vehicle search during mobile checkpoint operations. UNMAS continues to co-locate and embed technical advisors and operations staff with AMISOM at all levels and has operational offices in each of the sectors. In addition to providing technical advice and analysis, the technical advisors also participate in various coordination meetings and workshops on a regular basis and act as a link between sectors and Force Headquarters, supporting the information flow. UNMAS

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3 AMISOM’s extensive use of MSR s to move large logistical convoys provides a target for the IED aggressor.
continues to support the government in development of comprehensive national IED threat mitigation capability.

In addition, UNMAS provided 12 different types of training to AMISOM troops, to enhance their capability on explosive hazard mitigation. This includes, pre-deployment training, to enhance capacity of the troops to mitigate the threat posed by explosive hazards before they deploy and in-country training to strengthen their skills and capabilities when they are in Somalia. In addition to the training, UNMAS provided specialist equipment to the troops for various technical components of the work they do, across all the sectors. UNMAS also provided the training required for them to operate the equipment.

3.1.2 Outcomes

- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD\(^4\)) and IED threat mitigation advisory capacity at the disposal of AMISOM

UNMAS continues to train AMISOM personnel in all the sectors through both informal (e.g. on the job training or refresher training or continuation support) and formal trainings. UNMAS conducted the first two pre-deployment training programs, in Uganda which was attended by Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF). Pre-deployment training is crucial in preparing troops for deployment into Somalia and present early opportunities for UNMAS to engage with the leadership of the various TCCs. Approximately 16,710 troops from the five TCCs were trained in 2018, of which, 7.7% were members of the Mission Enabling Unit (MEU)\(^5\). The training of troops is a key element in enhancing AMISOM’s operational capacity in an explosive hazard environment. In addition to training, UNMAS continues to engage operationally at Force Headquarters, Mission Headquarters and Sector Headquarters. UNMAS also engages with various partners and stakeholders through meetings and workshops on IED threat mitigation and continues to provide technical advice.

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\(^4\) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance.

\(^5\) Training of MEU is vital as they support AMISOM’s logistical operations along MSRIs and patrols in areas of operations.
Various types of advisory material (e.g. newsletters, weekly and monthly reports, IED Awareness reports etc.) in four languages (French, English, Somali and Amharic) were distributed. The advisory materials that were distributed provided technical analysis in support of AMISOM's operations. The direct outcome of the advisory material, mentoring and equipment support is that AMISOM and stakeholders continued to have updated information on EOD and IED threat mitigation. UNMAS used this interaction to build positive relationships with AMISOM and other stakeholders, which enables continuity of operations and complementarity of efforts in daily operations. These interactions provide opportunities for stakeholders to continue harmonizing reporting on IEDs in Somalia.

- **Protection of key infrastructure is improved**

UNMAS supports AMISOM to ensure that key infrastructure is protected using EDD. The EDD component assisted with the protection of vital national and strategic assets and infrastructure\(^6\) in Somalia. The component deployed 34 EDDs managed by 17 trained EDD personnel or handlers. Across all the operational areas, approximately 419,000 pieces of luggage, 55,400 vehicles and 200 buildings were searched in 2018. The EDD teams continue to act as visual deterrents to potential perpetrators planning to conceal weapons and explosives. The presence of EDD teams thus, contributes to the improved safety and security of strategic infrastructure in support of AMISOM's operations.

\(^6\) As per UNMAS data set, vital strategic infrastructure includes Airports, Airstrips and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Hospitals, training centers, UN camps, Entry check points etc.
• **Training to enhance search capacity**

UNMAS contributed to improved search capacity in AMISOM by training troops in Search Techniques (route and static). To complement the training, UNMAS serviced, repaired and distributed specialist equipment to enable troops to carryout searches. Searches conducted at airstrips supported both commercial and UN flight movement. In Jalalqsi, after conducting searches, the World Food Programme was able to supply food rations to flood affected communities while in Beletweyne, Jowar and Bulo-burto, teams conducted regular search activities to ensure that airstrips were safe. During 2018, UNMAS supported AMISOM with 15,435 separate vehicular movements for their supplies, patrols and operations. On average 34.53% of these convoy movements were supported by EOD/IED teams while approximately 2.3% had mentoring teams attached. The presence of EOD/IED teams contribute to continued confidence and use of MSRs by convoys, which facilitates AMISOM’s operational movements. Convoys received pre and post deployment briefings which are key platform for information sharing as part of mentoring and advise for AMISOM’s operations. About 1,621 out of 1,715 AMISOM convoys were provided with a pre-deployment briefing, whereas 845 received post deployment briefing.

• **Mission Enabling Units (MEUs) have strengthened technical expertise at their disposal**

UNMAS continued to provide capacity building support to AMISOM’s MEUs. Trained members of the MEUs were deployed to support AMISOM operations and used their IED threat mitigation skills to support AMISOM in both logistical and operational convoys in line with their mandate. In 2018, approximately 773 MEU deployments supported 1,705 vehicular movements involving 52,000 tonnes of goods. Data showed a significant increase in tonnage moved with MEU support from 15,666 tonnes in 2017 to 52,000 tonnes in 2018. These goods were...
moved from Mogadishu to sectors, and hence UNMAS support contributed significantly to increased utilization of MSRs in 2018. UNMAS supported MEU teams by providing an updated threat assessment for each convoy and mentored them in the completion of the tasks from the preparatory stages until operational deployments. Such mentoring focused on mitigating the threat of IEDs by preparing the troops on how to operate in an IED threat environment and instilling greater confidence for mobility operations.

3.1.3 Impact of IEDs on civilian populations in 2018

The civilian population in Somalia continue to be severely impacted by explosive hazards in 2018. During the year, 215 civilians were killed and another 509 were injured as a result of IED attacks. Overall, civilian fatalities represent 44% of the total number fatalities caused by IEDs (215 out of 490), and 53% of the overall number of injuries by IEDs (509 out of 956). As shown in Figure 5 (below), AMISOM casualties are slowly declining overall, in part due to training, advice and mentoring provided by UNMAS. Unfortunately, SSF casualties are increasing, exceeding AMISOM casualties overall. While not being the primary target, civilians nevertheless continue to constitute the majority of casualties, primarily caused by Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs).

![Fig 5 – Improvised Explosive Device Casualties between 2017 and 2018.](image)

Most civilian fatalities were documented in Mogadishu (Banadir region) and Lower Shabelle region, largely due to the Al Shabaab deploying VBIEDs as shown in Figure 6 (below). The VBIEDs are assembled with larger quantities of explosives than devices used to target
convoys along MSRs and their detonations are more indiscriminate than other types of devices which are intended to strike a specific target.

![Fatality distribution by region in 2018](image)

*Fig 6 – Improvised Explosive Device Civilian fatalities per region in 2018.*

It is currently assessed that Al Shabaab do not deliberately target civilians when deploying IEDs but accepts the likelihood that civilians will be killed, most civilian casualties are collateral as opposed to deliberate. This supposition was supported in 2018 by the absence of large VBIED attacks.

Very few large VBIED attacks were documented in 2017 in Mogadishu, one of which resulting in 655 killed in October 2017. This attack was never formally acknowledged by Al Shabaab, and no further large VBIED event was recorded in Somalia thereafter. The absence of large VBIED incidents since October 2017 Zobe Junction bombing, plausibly demonstrates the Al Shabaab intent to limit occurrences of large numbers of civilian casualties during attacks conducted in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

### 3.1.4 Impact of IEDs hazards on UN operations in 2018

No explosive hazard incident impacted UN personnel and UN operations in 2018 in Somalia. IEDs and ERW however limit the ability of UN personnel to move around the mission area. As the UN hardened their compounds and facilities against VBIED and complex attacks, this may have encouraged Al Shabaab to focus on other attack methods such as the use of indirect fire weapon systems⁷.

Trends indicate that IEDs will remain a threat to UN personnel and operations in 2019, limiting the freedom of movement of UN personnel thereby indirectly hindering UN operations. Although no UN personnel were involved in an IED incident in 2018, an Al Shabaab VBIED

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⁷ For further details on these weapon systems see section 3.4 on Stand Off Weapons.
rammed a convoy of the European Union Training Mission (EU TM) near the Ministry of Defence in Mogadishu. The attack was deemed to be likely opportunistic, however, the targeting of foreign convoys by VBIEDs may become an emerging trend along traffic choke points in Mogadishu which would hamper UN personnel's visits to various government facilities. The hardening of government and private facilities such as hotels – prime targets for Al Shabaab since 2011 – has degraded the Al Shabaab ability to orchestrate complex attacks against these facilities. This may encourage Al Shabaab to shift its focus towards organizing more opportunistic, single VBIED bombing against mobile convoys.

The Al Shabaab ability to orchestrate complex attacks in Mogadishu has been degraded in 2018, however, the group maintains the ability to infiltrate VBIEDs into the Somali capital, a capability that has remained at consistent levels in 2017 and 2018. Although no UN convoy was attacked by VBIEDs in 2018, previous incidents were documented, and the likelihood of a UN convoy being attacked by VBIED in future cannot be ruled out. Similarly, at least one incident of a roadside IED targeting a UN convoy in the outskirts of Mogadishu was documented in the past and therefore such incidents cannot be ruled out in future.

3.2 Explosive Remnants of War/Mine Threats

Somalia still has a residual threat from ERW\(^8\) following decades of civil conflict. The majority of confirmed hazardous areas are minefields located along the Somalia-Ethiopia border where explosive hazards continue to pose a threat to the civilian population and hamper socioeconomic development. These ERW present an opportunity for the armed groups to harvest explosives for manufacturing IEDs. Somalia also has an internally displaced population and refugee population in the surrounding region who have been slowly returning to Somalia since late 2016. The presence of explosive hazards is a cause for concern in terms of the safety of the returnee population and those displaced internally. In Somalia, children are at a higher risk of being victims of ERW than adults; in 2017 alone, 75% of deaths and injuries caused by unexploded ordnance were among children. There is also growing evidence of community practices that increases risks including harvesting of explosive material for money, domestic stock-piling and use of explosive materials in commercial activities (e.g. quarry mining). These risk-taking practices are aggravated by unemployment and the lack of awareness in the communities.

\(^8\) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)
Fig 7: Known Explosive Hazard Threats in South-Central Somalia
3.2.1 Activities

- Clearance Activities

In response to the explosive hazards identified, UNMAS deployed four mobile explosive hazard clearance teams across four states; focusing on supporting AMISOM’s mobility and the wider community, through the identification and removal of explosive hazards within the broader explosive threat mitigation strategies. Multi-Tasking Teams\(^9\) (MTTs) conducted clearance activities to reduce the threat of explosive hazards by removing potential sources of explosive material. They responded to known hazards and attended to new callouts.

UNMAS deployed two manual demining teams along the border with Ethiopia in South-Central Somalia, where the teams located anti-tank mines in the minefields, including low-content mines dating back to WW-II. This was done as a stabilization effort through building the capacity to remove explosive hazards within the impacted communities, as well as ensuring commencement and continuance of economic activities when cleared land is handed over. These efforts contribute to the safety of communities from the threat posed by explosive hazards.

\(^9\) A team composed of personnel trained and equipped to conduct survey of an area suspected to have contaminated with explosive hazards, able to evaluate the hazard status of the object and dispose them off accordingly.
• Community Liaison Activities
UNMAS maintained its capacity of 16 Community Liaison Officers\(^\text{10}\) (CLOs) and 40 facilitators who accessed all liberated districts across South-Central Somalia. The CLOs conducted village assessments and route surveys in support of AMISOM’s Civil-Military Cooperation and other stabilization partners. They delivered risk education messages to the local communities, internally displaced persons and returnees. Training of Trainers (ToT) on risk education was also provided to the focal points within organizations working in support of internally displaced persons and returnees who then coordinated the risk education in communities. The critical information collected in the process is key in designing mitigation strategies and appropriate responses to violent extremism through public awareness and community participation. The activities targeted the most vulnerable community members, primarily youth and links with UNSOM’s Comprehensive Approach to Security Strand 4 whose emphasis is limiting the threat of violent extremism through community-based dialogues and awareness targeting youth and vulnerable populations.

• Coordination
UNMAS supported Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) in preparing the annual report on Ottawa Treaty implementation in Somalia and SEMA’s participation various international meetings\(^\text{11}\). In addition, UNMAS supported SEMA with an office facility and equipment. To improve coordination, UNMAS facilitated explosive hazards response meetings between Police EOD and SEMA in Mogadishu. UNMAS and SEMA jointly carried Victim Assistance situational analysis in Somalia through a process that engaged national and international stakeholders. The analysis provided specific recommendation of establishing victim assistance program in Somalia. Advocacy and resource mobilization efforts were also carried out resulting in portfolio of mine action projects being included in the Humanitarian Response Plan 2019.

\(^{10}\) Community liaison officers are men and women in explosive ordnance affected communities who exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and, or ERW, create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies.

\(^{11}\) Examples of the meetings includes the 17th Meeting of State Parties in Geneva, Switzerland
3.2.2 Outputs

In 2018, the four mobile MTTs reached over 297 task sites in four FMS, whose tasks included non-technical survey, battle area clearance and spot clearance. Spot clearance activities involved removing ERW, making them inaccessible to armed groups that potentially harvest them for manufacturing IEDs. During the year, MTTs verified\(^\text{12}\) an area totaling 6,718,613\(^\text{13}\) square meters in different task sites across the four FMS. In addition, the teams deployed in Mogadishu and verified Mogadishu National Stadium to be free of ERW in support of the National Transition Plan. UNMAS’ support in the exercise led to the successful rehabilitation of the sports facility which has now been handed over to the government. During the year, the demining teams manually cleared 124,118 square meters along the Ethiopian border, through manual clearance in support of the local communities.

\[\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& \text{Free from Explosives (FFEs)} & \text{Unexploded Ordnance (UXO/AXO)} & \text{Small Arms & Ammunition (SAA)} & \text{Anti-Personnel Mines (APs)} & \text{Anti-Tank Mines (ATs)} \\
\hline
\text{2303} & \text{545} & \text{224} & \text{44} & \text{7} \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

\textit{Fig 8 – Explosive remnants of war and mines cleared in Somalia in 2018}

Figure 8, shows categories of explosive hazards that were cleared by the teams during the 2018. Of the different categories, 74% of the ERW cleared were FFE, 17% were UXO and 7% were Small Arms and Ammunition (SAA). Although FFE do not pose a danger directly to communities, there is evidence that armed groups harvest them and use them as casings when constructing IEDs. Their removal is a necessary step in mitigating the threat of explosive hazards in the areas of operation and reduces the repeated callouts from the community who report FFEs as ERW. Somalia continues to register an increased number of SAA and anti-personnel mines compared to previous years. Some of the anti-tank mines removed by the demining teams dated back to World War II era and some had very low metal contents hence their removal requires extra precaution. A total of 4,011,538\(^\text{14}\) sqm were cleared, of which 3,766,370 sqm was surface clearance, of the cleared land 3,861,432 sqm were released.

\(^\text{12}\) Verification is confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled.
\(^\text{13}\) Approximately equivalent to 1256 football pitches
\(^\text{14}\) Approximately equivalent to 750 football pitches.
Across the districts, the demining activities restored access to land, thus reviving and creating new livelihood opportunities.

CLO conducted risk education, assessment of explosive hazards, village assessments and route surveys and covered over 342 villages and identifying 311 non-functional public facilities. They carried out 49 route surveys covering 2,529km, carried out 1,769 risk education sessions, reaching 30,667 participants in 2018. About 70% of the participants were children (both boys and girls) of various age groups, while 30% were adults. CLO also facilitated sessions of focus group discussions, where participants are provided with the opportunity to express their experiences and opinions on the root causes of violent extremism in their communities. Data collected during the sessions showed varied perceptions on the causes of violent extremism; however, unemployment was ranked highest among the main drivers of violent extremism that were mentioned.

UNMAS produced 2 key documents in support of ERW efforts in Somalia in 2018. UNMAS conducted a Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Behavior Survey (KAPB) Survey on ERW covering two FMS. The KAPB Survey informed UNMAS on the perception of civilian community on ERWs and how UNMAS and other stakeholders can support communities in managing explosive hazards threats in their communities. The Victim Assistance Situational Analysis report provided a comprehensive mapping of stakeholders with interest in victim assistance activities and the preparatory work that needs to be done for implementation of appropriate victim assistance activities.

UNMAS continues to engage stakeholders through various coordination structures in the mission and international engagements to raise awareness on the progress in dealing with ERW in Somalia. UNMAS participated in the Monitoring Reporting Mechanism, Protection Cluster and Explosive Hazard Sub-Cluster. UNMAS continues to enhance SEMA’s capacity and coordinate joint field visits to FMS to raise any ERW/landmine problems with the leadership of the states.

3.2.3 Outcomes and Impacts
UNMAS community-based approach in mine action provided increased employment opportunities for communities, mainly youth, who according to the recent data have traditionally been most vulnerable to violent extremism, in terms of recruitment. Consequently, the activities created safer living environments by reducing the threat posed by explosive hazards. This contributed to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals and the Somalia National Development Plan (NDP). UNMAS also considered clan diversity in the
recruitment process, which is a crucial aspect in creating a harmonious working environment and the empowerment of communities at the grassroots. Explosive risk awareness training was critical to changing the risk-taking behavior of individuals and collectively in the communities. Improvements in communication and information with the relevant stakeholders including sharing between AMISOM, the mission, humanitarian partners, local authorities and the wider community were observed, highlighting the value of the community-based approach.

Clearance of landmines and ERW mainly from former ammunition bunkers directly contributed to supporting AMISOM operations, by making these devices and their components unavailable to militants; thereby reducing the potential sources of IED components that can be manufactured and used against AMISOM and other opportune targets. This also facilitates improved safety and security which allows communities to re-build their lives and other sustainable development activities. Explosive hazards risk education contributes to increased risk awareness and a decrease in risk taking behaviors by the local populace which reduces the likelihood of accidents from ERW and mines.

UNMAS interventions enables and support the FGS’ strategies on Mine Action and their compliance with the relevant treaty obligations. There has been improved national management and coordination capability, capacity and responsiveness of SEMA to explosive hazards threats in Somalia. Ongoing clearance initiatives improved safety and security and ensured that communities have access to land that they would otherwise not have access to for agriculture and commercial use.

3.2.4 Key Message

Responding to the threat of explosive hazards in Somalia is crucial, despite challenges such as limited access to locations with explosive hazards, sensitive clan dynamics, as well the readiness and awareness of the authorities regarding the scale of the problem. Considering the fluid security situation of the country, community-based clearance presents a good option. It empowers Somali youth, creates jobs and contributes towards preventing violent extremism. Raising awareness of the threats of explosive hazards is also key, particularly in the context where community practices puts them at risk of injury and death. Despite the myriad of challenges, Somalia must be free of mines by 2022 to achieve Ottawa Treaty obligations.
3.3 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) / Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM)

3.3.1 Activities
UNMAS continues to support the FGS through the Office of the National Security Advisor by further developing a comprehensive WAM system. Through regular on the job training and mentoring, UNMAS continued its support to marking, registration and distribution of FGS weapons and ammunition and worked with the Security Sector Reform Office assisting FGS to notify the UN Sanctions Committee regarding progress towards its compliance with sanction obligations.

3.3.2 Outputs
UNMAS continued to work closely with the weapons marking teams to maintain and where possible further enhance their capacity to mark and register newly-imported weapons. During the reporting period, 8,000 weapons were marked and registered by UNMAS trained teams, while 121 had been disposed of by cutting. Technical support has also been provided to the biometric registration of weapons whereby individual security force members are linked to specific weapons. To date, 2,500 Somali security forces have undergone this process which strengthens weapons accountability and transparency.

3.3.3 Outcomes and Impacts
With support from UNMAS, the FGS has continued to make modest improvements in both their WAM capabilities and compliance with certain aspects of the UN Arms Embargo. This is recognized in UN Security Council Resolution 2444 of November 2018 which while extending the term and conditionality of the measures, also acknowledges the efforts made by FGS. That said, the scale of the remaining challenge to develop a coherent and effective WAM system in Somalia that assures the safety, security and accountability of stocks remains very significant and worthy of further UNMAS support.

During the reporting period, UNMAS steady and consistent support to FGS WAM processes has resulted in continued marking and registration of newly imported weapons that has supported the accounting and transparency required under UN Security Council arms embargo resolutions. UNMAS continues to support the processes leading to the establishment of the National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and endorsement of the draft SALW and Private Security Company legislation that awaits public consultation process.
3.3.4 Key Message

Over the reporting period, UNMAS has continued with its consistent technical WAM support to FGS, while also adding a policy level capability that has the potential to positively assist the government in all areas including compliance with international standards and treaties, improved compliance with relevant UN resolutions and the development of appropriate strategy and policy. In this respect, UNMAS remains well-positioned to maintain or expand its support.
3.4 Analysis of Stand-Off Weapons in Somalia

Stand-off weapons (SOW)\textsuperscript{15} used by Al Shabaab in Somalia include 60mm, 81/82mm and 120mm mortars, plus B10 (originally meant as an anti-tank weapon) but used by Al Shabaab in the indirect fire mode. Most SOW attacks occur against AMISOM FOBs in rural areas in South-Central Somalia, with 174 incidents recorded throughout 2018. The caliber used is rarely reported but majority of incidents in the rural areas use 81/82 mm mortars. There were no instances of 120 mm mortars reported in 2018 with the last recorded incident an attack against Balidogle in April 2017. SOW attacks in Mogadishu are relatively rare, with only 12 such attacks recorded in 2018. Most of the attacks inside the city use 60 mm mortars, mostly targeting the presidential palace at Villa Somalia or the stadium that used to house AMISOM forces, and to a lesser extent also the area around Mogadishu International Airport (MIA). Finally, 39 SOW attacks were recorded in 2018 in Puntland, primarily due to the ongoing stand-off between Puntland and Somaliland over the latter’s incursion into the disputed Sool region. Figure 9 (below) shows a comparison between SOW attacks in Mogadishu vis-à-vis the rural areas of South-Central Somalia and Puntland.

![Comparison of SOW Incidents](image)

**Fig 9 - Comparison Stand Off Weapons incidents Mogadishu Vs Rest of Somalia**

3.4.1 Geographical Spread of Stand-Off Weapons

In 2018 there was at least one attack targeting MIA, with 5 rounds on 01 July impacting just short of the perimeter of Al Jazeera gate. This was the first time that MIA had been targeted with 81/82mm mortars, and that in broad daylight. This attack was preceded by a similar attack in May against the Turkish military training facility south of MIA. SOW attacks in the rural areas primarily target AMISOM FOBs situated along various MSRs. Figure 10 (below) shows the spread of SOW impacts within Mogadishu from 2016 to 2018.

\textsuperscript{15} Any Weapons that involves an item of explosive ordnance being launched onto or into a target from a remote platform some distance from the target with the firer / emplaccer losing control of it following its launch.
while Figure 11 further (below) shows the spread of SOW impacts throughout Somalia from 2017 to 2018.

Fig 10 – Stand Off Weapon’s impacts in Mogadishu between 2016 - 2018
Fig 11 - Stand Off Weapons attacks in Somalia between 2017 – 2018
3.4.2 Stand-Off Weapons Trends

As can be seen from Figure 12 (below), Sector 1 (Lower Shabelle, excluding Mogadishu) continued to see the highest number of attacks, with a significant increase in the first three quarters of 2018, as compared to 2017, with a total of 71 incidents reported throughout 2018, followed by Sector 2 (Lower Juba), with 20 incidents, a significant increase, especially in the first half of 2018, as compared to only 8 incidents in 2017. Incident numbers in Sector 4 on the other hand dropped significantly in 2018, down from 17 in 2017 to 7 in 2018. The other sectors remained constant, with Sector 3 recording a total of 13 incidents, while Sectors 5 and 6 recorded 5 incidents each throughout 2018. It should however be noted that there may be underreporting, although the overall trends would, in all likelihood, remain the same. Finally, AMISOM on occasion also uses SOW to fend off Al Shabaab, with a total of 20 such incidents recorded in 2018.

![Fig 12- Geographic Spread of Stand Off Weapons by Sector / Quarter 2017 to 2018](image)

As can be seen from Figure 13 (below), the first quarter of 2018, and especially March, saw a marked increase in SOW incidents in rural areas, with an average of 16 such attacks per month, or roughly 8 attacks per month in Sector 1 alone. This seemed to be a continuation of the trend already observed in 2017, with 8 such attacks per month during the second half of the year, up from 5 such attacks per month during the first half. Incident levels in Mogadishu on the other hand remained at fairly similar (and low) levels, slightly up from the second half of 2017.
4. **Annex 1: Case Study**

**Clearing of Explosive Hazards in support of the Transition Plan - The Case of Mogadishu National Stadium**

Mogadishu National Stadium is one of the largest stadiums in Somalia, with a capacity of 60,000 spectators. The stadium was built in 1978 during the Siad Barre administration. It is in Warta-Nabada district, which is the North-East part of the city. In its former glory, the stadium was host to national and international sporting competitions.

Unfortunately, the national stadium was neglected due to prolonged conflicts over the last two decades in Somalia. At one point, the facility was controlled by Al Shabaab militants who turned it into training grounds for their combatants and a detention center for civilians. During this phase, sporting tournaments, youth forums and other community activities were banned by Al Shabaab.

In September 2011, AMISOM forces took over the stadium followed by relative peace and stability hence the development of Transition Plan in 2017. In August 2018, AMISOM troops handed over the stadium to Federal Government of Somalia. This created an opportunity for locals utilize the stadium but work on the restoration of the stadium had to be done first. Stakeholders working together with Banadir Regional Administration (BRA), deployed local worker and volunteers in efforts to restore the stadium but due to the likelihood of ERW contamination clearance of the facility was prioritized. UNMAS deployed a MTTs to carry out systematic clearance at the stadium while CLOs delivered pre-deployment risk education on
explosive hazards to the local workers and volunteers. A systematic clearance of the entire football pitch was carried out using the Large-Loop Metal Detector and Metal Detectors. A visual search was also carried out on the periphery of the stadium. The clearance teams found 5 UXO and 1,500 cartridge cases. After clearance, the stadium was handed over to representatives of BRA who then deployed 100 local workers to rehabilitate the stadium.

The clearance of the National Stadium rekindled hope in the people of Somalia, that things were taking a positive turn one location at a time. Given that the area was now free from explosive hazards, it allowed the workers, volunteers and residents to access the stadium safely. Stakeholders commended UNMAS for their contribution towards the process of rehabilitation of the stadium. A functioning stadium, free of hazards would stir the long-awaited return of sports to the country’s largest sports facility. This would create a positive foundation for the reintegration of youth and promotion of peaceful coexistence within the community.
5. **Annex 2: Key Resources in 2018**

- Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behavior (KAPB) Survey Report on ERW in Galmaduug and Puntland. Click [here](#).

- Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behavior (KAPB) Survey on IEDs in Mogadishu. Click [here](#).

- Participation of Women in Explosive Threat Mitigation in Somalia. Click [here](#).

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